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In 2020, the tenth democratic and free elections after the fall of the communist regime in 
Slovakia resulted in a broad coalition government, which obtained its mandate mainly to 
fight corruption. However, the global pandemic of COVID-19 has fundamentally 
changed priorities. Indeed, growing dissatisfaction with the governance of the state in 
early 2021 has led to the organization of a referendum on early parliamentary elections. 
The article draws attention to the constitutional problems associated with holding such a 
referendum in the conditions of the Slovak Republic, not only in general, but also, and 
especially, in times of crisis. 
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In 2020, the tenth democratic and free elections after the fall of the communist 
regime in Slovakia resulted in a broad coalition Government (four very different 
political parties, including conservatives, liberals and also populists)1, which 
obtained its mandate mainly to fight corruption. Although the governing coalition 
appears to have achieved some success in that field, the global pandemic of 
COVID-19 has fundamentally changed priorities. 
After a relatively mild beginning, the pandemic situation in Slovakia 
deteriorated significantly, especially at the turn of 2020 and 2021, which resulted 
in Slovak hospitals reaching full capacity. Therefore, not only opposition forces, 
political parties Smer – Sociálna demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy) and 
Hlas – Sociálna demokracia (Voice – Social Democracy), but also experts and the 
general public had started to rebuke the Government of the Slovak Republic 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Government’) for failing to manage the State in 
times of crisis. The problem was not only the poor communication of restrictive 
measures, but also selection and frequent changes thereof, which often gave an 
impression that the Government was working by the method of trial and error. 
Also, other problems were raised up, such as cases concerning doubts about the 
authenticity of the final university theses of both Boris Kollár, the Speaker of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter the ‘National Council’ or the 
‘Slovak Parliament’) and Igor Matovič2, the Prime Minister himself. Growing 
dissatisfaction with the administration of the Country during the crisis in early 
2021 resulted in efforts of the two most relevant opposition political parties3 to 
hold early parliamentary elections. Instead of elections in 2024, they demanded 
that elections take place in the autumn of 2021. 
As the bill proposing a constitutional act which would shorten the Slovak 
Parliament’s running term- did not pass, the opposition came up with an initiative 
to reach early parliamentary elections by a referendum. The referendum on 
shortening the parliamentary term leading to early elections is nothing new in 
Slovakia, despite the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly mention that 
possibility. Since the establishment of an independent State in 1993, two such 
referendums have been held. The first in 2000, the second in 2004. However, 
none of these referendums was successful, whereby, as we explain below, the 
                                                 
1 Namely, Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary people and independent personalities); 
Sme Rodina (We are the family), Sloboda a solidarita (Freedom and solidarity) and Za ľudí (For 
the people). 
2 On 1 April 2021, Igor Matovič was replaced as Prime Minister by Eduard Heger, former Minister 
of Finance. 
3 These opposition political parties are Smer – Sociálna demokracia (Direction – Social 
Democracy), led by former Prime Minister Robert Fico (Prime Minister in 2006-2010, 2012-2016 
and 2016-2018), and Hlas – Sociálna demokracia (Voice – Social Democracy), led by other 
former Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini (Prime Minister from 2018 to 2020), which was created 
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validity of the vote presupposes the participation of an absolute majority of all 
eligible voters4. 
From the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Constitution’) point of view5, the referendum on early elections is more than 
problematic, despite the fact that it has already taken place twice. In addition, 
holding a referendum and consequently parliamentary elections in the time of 
crisis caused by the pandemic raises further constitutional issues. Therefore, the 
aim of this article is to briefly draw attention to the constitutional problems 
associated with holding a referendum on early elections in the conditions of the 
Slovak Republic, not only in general, but also in times of crisis specifically. 
 
2. Parliamentary elections and national referendum in Slovakia 
 
Before addressing the problematic aspects of the referendum on early elections, 
it is appropriate to provide the non-Slovak reader with basic information about 
constitutional and legal regulation of parliamentary elections and national 
referendum in Slovakia. 
The foundations of the constitutional regulation of parliamentary elections, 
elections to the National Council, can be found in the first section of the fifth 
chapter of the Constitution (Articles 73 to 92) devoted to legislative power. The 
National Council is the supreme representative and sole legislative body of the 
Slovak Republic consisting of 150 deputies elected for a four-year term. All 
citizens of the Slovak Republic older than 18 years have the right to elect 
Members of the National Council. The right to be elected belongs to citizens older 
than 21 years of age with a permanent residence in the Country. Details on 
obstacles to exercise the right to vote and the right to be elected are governed6, on 
the basis of a constitutional blanket norm, by the Electoral Act7. The Electoral Act 
regulates electoral system too, as the Constitution remains silent on this issue. 
Members of the Slovak Parliament are elected through a proportional electoral 
system with bound candidates’ lists. Candidates’ list can only be submitted by 
registered political parties or their coalitions, and only by parties or coalitions that 
payed an election deposit of EUR 17,000 and meet the minimum number of 
members. All 150 seats in the National Council are distributed in a single national 
constituency. An electoral quota system, namely the Hagenbach-Bischoff 
electoral quota, is used for the distribution. 
                                                 
4 The 2000 referendum was attended by 20.03% of citizens entitled to vote. Participation in the 
second referendum was slightly higher, namely 35.86%. The slightly higher turnout in the second 
referendum was probably because it took place on the same day as the first round of election of the 
President of the Slovak Republic. 
5 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, no. 460/1992 Coll. as amended till date. 
6 For more details on obstacles in exercising the right to vote in Slovakia as one of the persistent 
problems of the right to vote, see M. Domin, Thirty Years of Democratic and Free Elections in 
Slovakia: Can really Everyone Vote?, in Acta Universitatis Danubius, Vol. 16 No. 3, 2020, pp. 7-
20, https://dj.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/AUDJ/article/view/590/921. 
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As regards the referendum, the Constitution envisages several types thereof. In 
addition to the referendum at the municipality level and another one at the self-
governing region level, the Constitution refers to a national referendum regulated 
in the second section of the fifth chapter (Articles 93 to 100). Involving a national 
referendum in the part of the Constitution regulating legislative power suggests 
that this referendum is considered, in addition to the activities of the National 
Council, to be the second possible way of exercising legislative power8. All 
citizens of the Slovak Republic who have the right to elect Members of the 
National Council are eligible to participate in the national referendum. 
Organizational details are left to the Electoral Act. However, the Constitution 
governs the subject of the referendum and who and under what conditions can call 
it. In accordance with Art. 93 par. 2, a referendum may decide on important issues 
of public interest9. However, the following paragraph 3 adds that «No issues of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, taxes, levies and the State budget may be 
decided by a referendum». The referendum is called by the President of the 
Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the ‘President of the Republic’). 
Nevertheless, the President of the Republic can only do so, if the National Council 
or a group of at least 350,000 citizens ask them to call a referendum. Even before 
the referendum is called, the President of the Republic may apply to the 
Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Constitutional Court’) to examine the compliance of the subject of the 
referendum with the Constitution. If the conclusion is the inconsistency of the 
subject of the referendum with the Constitution, the referendum cannot be called 
and held. Therefore, the President of the Republic calls a referendum only if all 
formal and material conditions are met. If so, the President of the Republic is 
obliged to declare a referendum10. For the results of the referendum to be valid, 
the participation of an absolute majority of all citizens entitled to vote is required. 
The proposal adopted in the referendum is subsequently to be promulgated by the 
National Council in the same way as a law, it means in the Collection of Laws. 
 
3. Problems of a referendum on early elections in general 
 
The institute of national referendum belongs, together with the position of the 
President of the Republic, to the most problematic parts of the Slovak 
constitutional system. The key issues of the referendum are related to the 
                                                 
8 That conclusion was even repeatedly confirmed by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak 
Republic, namely in its decisions II. ÚS 31/97 of 1997 and PL. ÚS 24/2014 of 2014. 
9 Article 93 par. 1 of the Constitution presupposes a referendum confirming a constitutional act on 
the entry of the Slovak Republic into a State union with other States or on the withdrawal from 
such a union. However, this type of referendum, referred to by the Slovak constitutional doctrine 
as the so-called mandatory referendum, has never been used in practice. Also the 2003 referendum 
on the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union was held under the Art. 93 par. 2, 
thus, as a referendum on other important issues of public interest. 
10 The same opinion in M. Giba et al., Ústavné právo, Wolters Kluwer, Bratislava, 2019, p. 211 or 
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question, whether or not the Members of the National Council (hereinafter also 
referred to as the ‘MPs’), for whom the Constitution determines the prohibition of 
imperative mandate, are bound by the results of a referendum, as well as how to 
force MPs to reflect the will of citizens expressed in the referendum in the legal 
order. However, the following lines abstract to a certain extent from the above-
mentioned problems and focus only on the question of constitutionality of a 
referendum on early parliamentary elections. 
The fundamental problem of a referendum on early parliamentary elections lies 
in the fact that the Constitution does not mention it at all. On the one hand, the 
Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it, for example in the calculation referred 
to in Art. 93 par. 3., on the other hand, the Constitution does not explicitly allow 
the referendum in question either. The wording of a law, all the more so the 
wording of a constitution, cannot cover everything, but as a matter of fact, the 
Slovak constitutional regulation of the referendum is not sufficient. However, 
holding a referendum on early parliamentary elections, due to the absence of 
explicit regulation, may contradict various other provisions and principles of the 
Constitution. 
Due to the insufficient wording of the Constitution, controversy about the 
constitutionality and admissibility of holding a referendum on early elections has 
arisen and persisted among Slovak constitutional law experts, despite the fact that 
such a referendum has already taken place twice, as we have mentioned. 
Therefore, the following lines will briefly present basic arguments of both groups, 
advocates and opponents of a referendum on early elections11. 
Perhaps the most common argument for stating that a referendum on early 
parliamentary elections is contrary to the Constitution is the one saying that such a 
referendum would essentially be the referendum on fundamental rights and 
freedoms, which is explicitly prohibited by the Art. 93 par. 3 of the Constitution. 
This argument was already presented in 2004 by Ernest Valko and Katarína 
Babiaková12 with regard to the then held referendum on early elections. In 
connection with the forthcoming referendum in 2021, this argument was repeated 
by Eduard Barány13 and especially by Vincent Bujňák14. The logic of this so-
                                                 
11 Other constitutional problems, such as the enforceability of its results, are linked to the 
referendum on early election. For details, see M. Kajla, Referendum o predčasných parlamentných 
voľbách v podmienkach Slovenskej republiky (Referendum on early parliamentary elections in 
Slovak Republic), in Studia Iuridica Cassoviensia, Vol. 7 No. 1, 2019, pp. 21-29, 
https://sic.pravo.upjs.sk/ecasopis/72019-
1/2_kajla_referendum_o_predcasnych_parlamentnych_volbach.pdf. 
12 See E. Valko, K. Babiaková, Fenomén predčasných parlamentných volieb a referenda (The 
phenomenon of early parliamentary elections and referenda), in Justičná revue, Vol. 56, No. 3, 
2004, pp. 291-298. 
13 See E. Barány, Protipandemické opatrenia, ústavné limity a ľudské práva (Anti-pandemic 
measures, constitutional limitations and human rights), in Slovenské národné noviny, 22 February 
2021, https://snn.sk/news/protipandemicke-opatrenia-ustavne-limity-a-ludske-prava/. 
14 See V. Bujňák, Predčasné voľby. Prečo skrátenie volebného obdobia referedom nie je ústavné 
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called human rights argument lies in the fact that shortening the Parliamentʼs term 
otherwise than explicitly envisaged by the Constitution (dissolution of the 
National Council by the President of the Republic) or by the decision of the 
members of Slovak Parliament themselves, violates Art. 30 par. 4 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees the right of citizens to equal access to elected and 
other public offices. Therefore, MPs serving for a term shortened by a referendum 
would not be able to exercise their electoral programmes in the same way as MPs 
who would serve for the full term. Following the above-mentioned, Bujňák adds 
that the acceptance of a referendum on early parliamentary elections could lead to 
even greater excesses. If we accepted referendum question on shortening the term 
of the entire National Council, what would prevent the acceptance of a question 
leading to expiration of the mandate of a particular Member of the National 
Council for the specific way in which they have voted in parliamentary debate15? 
Advocates of the constitutionality of a referendum on early elections, such as 
Tomas Ľalík16, also accept the inadmissibility of the outlined question concerning 
the duration of the mandate of a particular Member of the National Council. 
However, Ľalík considers deprivation of mandate of all deputies acceptable as a 
result of the referendum on early elections, because restriction of the rights of 
MPs, if any at all, would be only mediated and institutional, not individual17. 
However, general principles of the Constitution, in particular the principle of the 
sovereignty of the people and the principle of democracy, speak in favour of the 
constitutional acceptability of a referendum on early parliamentary elections. The 
above-mentioned principles expressed in the first chapter of the Constitution (Art. 
1 and Art. 2) suggest that all power in the State begins and ends with the people 
(citizens) and therefore the people cannot be considered just as an object of public 
power, but, on the contrary, as its subject18. According to advocates of the 
constitutionality of a referendum on early elections, the nature of representative 
democracy in general and the nature of a mandate of MPs in particular, should 
also support their conclusions. Namely, a Member of the National Council, as 
well as any other representative of a public authority, is only a representative of 
citizens and exercises public power only because it has been entrusted to them for 
a limited period of time by citizens, especially through elections. As Ľalík aptly 
points out, a representative cannot be more than the one he represents. The 
possibility of early parliamentary elections following a referendum could 
ultimately strengthen the responsibility of MPs, which should be present at all 
times, and not just every four years when regular parliamentary elections are held. 




16 See T. Ľalík, Prečo je skrátenie volebného obdobia referendom ústavné (Why is the shortening 
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The third possible approach, but probably not the last, is an approach that can 
be described as a systemic one. It was presented in 200819 and recently further 
developed by Marián Giba20. He points out that in the Constitution one can find 
both arguments for and against a referendum on early elections. However, he 
arrives at conclusion that the referendum on early elections is contrary to the 
‘spirit’ of the Constitution, more specifically, it is contrary to the constitutional 
system of the Slovak Republic that can be described as a parliamentary form of 
government21. Giba emphasizes, and one can only agree with this, that early 
elections should be an exceptional way out of crisis and not a tool for reviewing 
or denying the results of previous elections22. The possible establishment of the 
referendum on early elections practice would be dangerous, as it would lead to 
relativization of the importance of parliamentary elections as such. Why would 
voters attach any special importance to elections if they knew that their results 
would not be ‘valid’ for four years, but could be changed in a relatively short 
time, thanks to a referendum? The sketched relativization of the significance of 
elections could ultimately be understood as an interference with fundamental 
rights and freedoms, specifically with the suffrage. However, it would not be the 
interference with the right of MPs but with a voting right. 
The efforts of opposition political parties to change the balance of political 
forces in Parliament, which we are witnessing in Slovakia even today, are 
understandable, but they are not compatible with how the parliamentary form of 
government should work. It must not be forgotten that a change in the balance of 
forces in the Slovak Parliament is conceivable even without elections. The 
Constitution provides MPs with various tools to do so23. 
 
                                                 
19 M. Giba, Referendum o predčasných voľbách: niekoľko úvah (Referendum on early elections: 
some considerations), in Míľniky práva v stredoeurópskom priestore 2007, Univerzita 
Komenského v Bratislave, Právnická fakulta, Bratislava, 2008, pp. 572-579. 
20 M. Giba, Referendum o predčasných voľbách alebo rozklad suverenity ľudu pod zámiekou jej 
výkonu (Referendum on early elections or decay of people’s sovereignty under the pretext of its 
exercise), in Denník N, 26 February 2021, https://dennikn.sk/2287699/referendum-o-predcasnych-
volbach-alebo-rozklad-suverenity-ludu-pod-zamienkou-jej-vykonu/. 
21 In Slovak literature, one can also find a certain relativization of the conclusion that the Slovak 
Republic is a parliamentary form of government. However, a key feature of the parliamentary 
form of government, the formation of the Government based on the results of parliamentary 
elections, holds valid. 
22 M. Giba, Referendum o predčasných voľbách: niekoľko úvah (Referendum on early elections: 
some considerations), in Míľniky práva v stredoeurópskom priestore 2007, Univerzita 
Komenského v Bratislave, Právnická fakulta, Bratislava, 2008, p. 574. 
23 For example, MPs could by an obstruction achieve the reason prescribed by the Constitution for 
the dissolution of the National Council by the President of the Republic (inability to pass 
resolutions lasting more than three months). Another possibility lies in the adoption of a 
Constitutional Act on shortening the term of the Slovak Parliament. Although this solution is also 
not explicitly envisaged by the Constitution and is criticized by constitutional lawyers, from a 
systemic point of view, it is more acceptable than shortening the term by a referendum. Namely, 
such a solution requires a consensus of three fifths of the Members of the National Council to 
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4. Problems of a referendum on early elections in times of crisis 
 
The admissibility is not the only issue of a referendum on early elections, 
which should be held in the current times of crisis. The constitutional system of 
the Slovak Republic, through the Constitutional Act on the Security of the State 
(hereinafter referred to also as the ‘Constitutional Act’)24, allows to declare war, 
the state of war, the exceptional state or the state of emergency in times of crisis. 
The threat to human life and health due to a pandemic is specifically the reason 
for declaring the state of emergency, which has been declared twice in Slovakia 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For the first time the state of emergency lasted 
from March 2020 to June 2020, for the second time it was declared with effect 
from 1 October 2020 and continues to this day25. The Constitutional Act on the 
Security of the State during the state of emergency allows a broader restriction of 
fundamental rights and freedoms than at the time of standard constitutional 
regime. This possibility has been used in practice by the Slovak Government. In 
the following lines, we will briefly look at how the state of emergency, or even 
another crisis situation, could affect the practical implementation of a referendum 
on early elections and subsequent parliamentary elections. 
Restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms that may occur during the 
state of emergency or other crisis are understood by the Constitutional Act on the 
Security of the State as the maximum acceptable. Therefore, restrictions on rights 
other than those expressly mentioned in the Constitutional Act are not 
permissible. At the same time, the rights which the Constitutional Act provides for 
a possible restriction can be restricted only to the extent and for the time 
necessary. In other words, the restrictions must be in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality. As the Constitutional Act does not mention the 
restriction of the right to vote in a referendum or a referendum itself at all, the 
conclusion must be that a declaration and holding of a referendum, regardless of 
its subject, is possible even during the state of emergency or other crisis. 
Yet, in the case of elections, the situation is different. The Constitutional Act 
on the Security of the State presupposes that during war or the state of war26 it is 
permissible not to call and therefore not to hold elections, including parliamentary 
elections. However, the Constitutional Act speaks of the possibility of not calling 
elections «during regular election terms», suggesting that the possibility of not 
calling and not holding elections and thus restricting the voting right only applies 
to regular elections. However, such an interpretation would be contrary to the 
essence of the restriction in question. Not only regular elections but any elections 
                                                 
24 Constitutional Act no. 227/2002 Coll. on the Security of the State in Time of War, State of War, 
Exceptional State and State of Emergency, as amended till date. 
25 At least until 1 March 2021, when these lines are written. 
26 It is not clear whether a restriction on the right to vote consisting in the non-holding of elections 
is possible even in the event of the exceptional state. Although the Constitutional Act on the 
Security of the State does not mention this possibility among the measures permitted at the time of 
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could contribute to the spread of COVID-19 and negative consequences 
associated with it. Therefore, one can incline to the conclusion that the possibility 
of not voting also applies to early elections, that is to say, to elections that do not 
take place in the end of regular parliamentary terms. However, this does not apply 
at the time of emergency state. Therefore, according to the Constitutional Act, 
elections are to be held even during the state of emergency. 
If there is a political will to avoid a referendum on early elections, which 
cannot be completely ruled out in the conditions of Slovak political culture, one 
can see the solution in the restriction of other fundamental rights and freedoms 
important for the initiation and practical conduct of the referendum. In connection 
with a petition aimed at obtaining signatures to require a referendum, the Slovak 
Ministry of the Interior reminded that during the state of emergency, government-
imposed restrictions of freedom of residence and movement in the form of curfew 
apply27. Participation in a petition aimed at collecting signatures for the request 
for a referendum is not among the permitted exceptions for that curfew. However, 
the proposed approach would be in conflict with the Constitutional Act on the 
Security of the State and with the Constitution. It would mean a restriction on the 
right to petition and, ultimately, the right to take part in a referendum. But the 
Constitutional Act does not allow restricting one fundamental right as a result of 
formal restriction imposed to another. However, such a procedure, which would 
make it possible to prevent any activity of people, in extreme cases also 
participation in early elections as such, is clearly inadmissible in a state governed 
by the rule of law. Finally, the Slovak Republic is also proclaimed the State 
governed by the rule of law28. The basic principles of the rule of law, which form 
the common legacy of not only European democracies, must always apply, even 




The article tried, especially focusing on a non-Slovak reader, to summarize the 
current controversies regarding the possibility of holding a referendum on early 
parliamentary elections in Slovakia. As it is clear from the above lines, there are 
relevant arguments in favour of both the conclusion on the constitutionality of the 
referendum and the opposite one. The only entity empowered to decide 
authoritatively on this dispute is the Constitutional Court. As we have already 
said, the Constitution entrusts it with the power to decide on the conformity of the 
subject of a referendum with the Constitution. An unavoidable precondition, 
                                                 
27 It should be added that various exceptions exist for that curfew: atrip to work, atrip to purchase 
food or medicines etc. 
28 Article 1 par. 1 of the Constitution states that «the Slovak Republic is a sovereign, democratic 
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however, is that the President of the Republic turns to the Constitutional Court 
after receiving the request for a referendum29. 
Whatever decision the Constitutional Court arrives at, it will almost certainly 
become the target of criticism, either by the governing coalition or by opposition 
political parties30. Although such criticism must be taken into account, as 
constitutional law and politics are close, the ideal solution would be to amend the 
wording of the Constitution to consider a referendum on early elections. The 
author of this article favours the possibility of the Constitution allowing a 
referendum on early parliamentary elections. However, there is a need to ensure 
that such preconditions are met, which would reduce the chance of abusing this 
institute in the competition of political forces. Namely, a referendum on early 
elections should be used only if it appears to be a really inevitable and effective 
way out of a constitutional political crisis. One option would be to set particularly 
strict conditions for initiating such a referendum (more than just 350,000 
signatures for the request of a referendum). Another solution could be to 
determine that such a referendum cannot be held, for example, earlier than 1 or 2 
years after the last parliamentary elections and later than a year before the next 
ones. Abuse of a referendum on early elections could also be prevented by a 
measure based on the prohibition of the repeated referendum during one term of 
Slovak Parliament in the event of failure of the previous one (invalidity or 
negative result). 
Controversy over the admissibility of a referendum on early elections would 
probably not have arisen at all, if the level of political culture in Slovakia was 
higher. Under ideal conditions, a strong criticism of the ruling representatives in a 
substantial part of the society, reflected in the high number of signatures on the 
petition calling for a referendum on early elections, should lead to the end of the 
term of political representatives and to new elections by their own action. 
Unfortunately, in Slovakia, such an approach is something so far comparable to 
films in Sci-Fi genre. 
Regarding the connection of a referendum on early elections with the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic, it is still to be added that although the Constitutional Act on 
the Security of the State does not preclude holding a referendum or election 
during the state of emergency, it is worth considering whether this solution would 
                                                 
29 So far, the Constitutional Court decided on the constitutionality of the subject of a referendum 
only in 2014. The referendum in question, called the referendum on family, was finally held in 
2015. However, it consisted of three instead of the original four questions, because one of 
questions was declared unconstitutional. For more details see. M. Rybár, A. Šovčíková, The 2015 
Referendum in Slovakia, in East European Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1-2, 2016, pp. 79-88, 
https://politicalscience.ceu.edu/sites/politicalscience.ceu.hu/files/attachment/basicpage/1096/mare
krybar_0.pdf. 
30 However, it is sad if academics are the target of criticism of political parties for commenting on 
the issue of constitutionality of the referendum in question. An example of such inappropriate 
involvement of academics in political rivalry is, for example, the press conference of 
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be a good one. Yet, this is not the case if the inability of political representatives 
to manage the State in times of crisis exceeds a tolerable level. However, it is 
questionable whether this has already happened in Slovakia. 
